NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 27 | Number 2

Article 17

2-1-1949

Libel -- Theories of Liability -- Publication as Single
or Multiple Tort
Robert Perry Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert Perry Jr., Libel -- Theories of Liability -- Publication as Single or Multiple Tort, 27 N.C. L. Rev. 271 (1949).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol27/iss2/17

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

19493
NOTES AND COMMENTS
271
immediate consequence would be to discredit the union in the eyes of
the employees by demonstrating that the union does not effectively represent them.27 The ultimate consequence may be the complete destruction
of the actual bargaining capacity of the representative.28
LIvINGSTON VERNON.

Libel-Theories of Liablity-Publication as Single
or Multiple Tort
At common law it was uniformly held that each time a libelous
article was brought to the attention of a third person a new publication
had occurred and each publication gave rise to a separate cause of
action.' This is still the law in many jurisdictions2 and is the view
adopted by the Restatement of Torts,8 but the weight of modern author-

ity favors the "single publication" rule of liability. 4 This rule contemplates that, whereas each publication does give rise to a separate cause
of action, in the case of newspapers, magazines and books there is but
one publication which occurs at the place where the alleged libel is published 5 and is completed when the libelous matter has been composed,
6
printed and generally distributed.
" National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, 94 F. 2d 862, 870
(C. C.A. 2d 1938).
28 Ibid.
IODGERs, LIBEL AND SLANDER 139 (6th ed. 1929); see Age-Herald Pub. Co. v.

Huddleston,
207 Ala. 40, 43, 92 So. 193, 196 (1921).
2
E.g., Hartmann v. American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736 (W. D. Wis. 1947);
Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (E. D. Wash. 1943), app. dismissed, 144 F. 2d 249 (C. C. A. 9th 1944) ; Lockey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
26 Tenn. App. 564, 174 S. W. 2d 575 (1943); Underwood v. Smith, 93 Tenn.
687, 27 S. W. 1008 (1894) ; Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 138 Tex. 434, 160 S. W.
2d 246 (1942) ; Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75
(1849).
3
RESTATEMENT, TORTS §578(b) (1938).
'Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F. 2d 127 (C. C. A. 3d 1948); Polchlopek v.
American News Co., 73 F. Supp. 309 (D. Mass. 1947); McGlue v. Weekly Publications, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass. 1946); Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F.
Supp. 660 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Backus v. Look, 39 F. Supp. 662 (S. D. N. Y.
1939) ; Means v. MacFadden Publications, 25 F. Supp. 993 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ;
Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921); Winrod v.
Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N. E. 2d 708 (1948); Forman v. Mississippi Publisher's Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344 (1943) ; Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 298 N. Y. 119, 81 N. E. 2d 45 (1948), reversing, 272 App. Div. 591, 74
N. Y. S. 2d 238 (1st Dep't 1947); Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App.
Div. 211, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 640 (4th Dep't 1938), aff'd, 279 N. Y. 716, 18 N. E. 2d
676 (1939), rearg. denied, 280 N. Y. 572, 20 N. E. 2d 21 (1939); see Julian v.
Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 71, 107 S. W. 496, 500 (1907); cf. Murray v.
Galbraith, 86 Ark. 50, 109 S. W. 1011 (1908).
Contra: Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S. W. 496 (1907).
Compare Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921)
with Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., supra.
' General distribution to newsstands and subscribers is all that is required. The
mailing out of miscellaneous copies to replace those lost or damaged, or in response
to requests for the purchase of single copies is a part of the original publication
and does not constitute a republication such as will amount to an additional tort
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This conflict of theories has been thrown into sharp relief by a
recent Pennsylvania federal court decision. 7 Defendant, Time, Inc., in
an issue of Life magazine dated January 17, 1944, published an alleged
libel concerning plaintiff, Hartmann. Plaintiff instituted his suit for
damages on January 17, 1945, exactly one year after the date of the
magazine. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted by
the trial court s on the theory that while the issue bore the date January
17, 1944, general distribution to newsstands and subscribers had been
completed January 14, 1944, and, therefore, under the law, plaintiff's
cause of action, which had accrued on that date, was now barred by
the Pennsylvania one year statute of limitations. Plaintiff appealed.
For reasons beyond the scope of this note, the circuit court of appeals
held that plaintiff's complaint was broad enough to cover all causes of
action arising in his favor in the various states and foreign countries
and that under the doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins the law of the
jurisdiction in which each cause arose would govern in the creation of
substantive rights. For that reason, the summary judgment was correct as applied to those causes of action arising in "single publication"
jurisdictions, but erroneous as to those causes which accrued in "multiple tort" states, since in the latter group a new and different cause of
action is deemed to have arisen each time the libelous publication is
brought to the attention of a third party.
Obviously, this decision makes it necessary for the district court to
investigate the law of libel in the various jurisdictions so that it may
determine what portion of plaintiff's over-all claim persists and what
portion has been barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, we too
are put on inquiry as to North Carolina's position in regard to this
conflict in theories of liability.
The North Carolina stand is not clear. Indeed, the reports would
indicate that the supreme court has not spoken at all, but in one case10
it is apparent from the defendant's pleading and brief 1 that the single
E.g., Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F. 2d 127 (C. C. A. 3d 1948);
Polchlopek v. American News Co., 73 F. Supp. 309 (D. Mass. 1947); Backus v.
Look, 39 F. Supp. 662 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston,
207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921) ; Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N. E.
2d 708 (1948) ; Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N. Y. 119, 81 N. E. 2d 45
(1948). Wide circulation serves only to increase the damages. E.g., Hartmann
v. Time, Inc., sipra; Winrod v. Time, Inc., supra; Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's
Sons, supra. Contra: Winrod v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249
(N. D. Ill.
1945) (supports single publication rule insofar as it applies to the
completed process of composing, printing and distributing, but will not permit
mailing out of additional copies later).
Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F. 2d 127 (C. C. A. 3d 1948).
8
Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671 (E. D. Pa. 1946).
or torts.

p304 U. S. 64 (1938).
Harrell v. Goerch, 209 N. C. 741, 184 S. E. 489 (1936).
"Brief for Appellee, p. 4, Harrell v. Goerch, 209 N. C. 741, 184 S. E. 489
(1936).
10
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publication rule has been pressed upon our court and rejected insofar
as that theory contemplates that the publication is completed when the
libelous matter has been generally distributed. Since, however, there
was no discussion of, or reference to, defendant's contention in the
report of the case, and since, at worst, only a portion of the rule was
rejected, this case need be given little, if any, weight in future adjudications and the court remains free to adopt the theory it finds most appealing to logic and justice.
It is submitted that the better reasoning favors the single publication, single tort rule and that the North Carolina court, when once
again given the opportunity to do so, should follow the line of decisions
which support it.
The old common law principles on which the multiple tort theory
is founded had their origin in relation to the single acts of individuals
in a more primitive society and should not be applied to the widely
circulated publications of today.12 To allow a plaintiff to pursue a
defendant publisher or distributor into every jurisdiction in which the
alleged libel is circulated, to give him as many causes of action within
each jurisdiction as there are copies circulated, and to set the statute
of limitations running anew with each purchase or perusal of the libelous
3
matter by a third person is "to shock the sense of justice and right.'
Such a rule of liability renders the statute of limitations completely ineffective,14 restricts the freedom of the press,' 5 operates as a burden
16
upon the courts and is impractical in application.
On the other hand, reasons why the multiple tort rule should persist
and the single tort doctrine be abandoned are rarely advanced and are
difficult of ascertainment. 1 7 The only discoverable specific objection to
12
Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921).
3See Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 101, 107 S.W. 496, 510
(1907) (dissenting opinion); accord, Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78
N. E. 2d 708 (1948) ; Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N. Y. 119, 81 N. E.
2d 45 (1948).
"'E.g., Means v. MacFadden Publications, 25 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. N. Y.
1939) ; Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N. Y' 119, 81 N. E. 2d 45 (1948).
Under the multiple tort doctrine the statute can never run so as to absolutely bar
an action as long as there is in existence a single copy of the publication capable
of being passed around or sold. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185,
117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849) (a newspaper was published more than 17 years before
suit was brought. Defendant pleaded the statute of limitations, but it was held
that the plea was negatived by proof that a single copy had been purchased within
the "Hartmann
statutory period).
v. Time, Inc., 166 F. 2d 127, 134 (C. C. A. 3d 1948).
10 Even if the circulation were restricted to one county, the rule, carried to
its logical conclusion, would permit the plaintiff to enlarge his declaration to
include as many counts as there are subscribers. Forman v. Mississippi Publisher's Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 107, 14 So. 2d 344, 347 (1943).
17 In multiple publication decisions, the old rule is usually accepted (and the
single publication rule rejected) with no reasons assigned. Holden v. American
News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24, 32 (E. D. Wash. 1943) ; Lockey v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 26 Tenn. App. 564, 174 S.W. 2d 575, 581 (1943) ; Renfro Drug Co. v.
Lawson, 138 Tex. 434, 443, 160 S.W. 2d 246, 251 (1942).
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the modern rule is that under it a venomous publisher "could with immunity print a large number of extra copies of an issue containing
libelous matter, retain them on hand and from time to time through
the years mail them to members of the general public."'1 This, it is
urged, would be a part of the original publication and, as such, would
not amount to another tort.
This argument, though weighty, would seem to be more concerned
with the applicability than the validity of the single publication doctrine.
It is to be remembered that this new theory of liability finds its basic
justification in the fact that it protects the publisher or distributor of
integrity from the legal hazards arising out of mass distribution of his
printed matter.19 This justification is lost in the case of a malicious
defendant who persists in circulating the libelous matter for the sake
of the libel itself and not as a usual business practice,2 0 and the beneficial single tort rule would appear inapplicable. In such a case, the
single publication court could hold with consistence that the further
malicious act of distribution, not occurring in the ordinary course of
business, amounts to a new publication and a new tort.
RoBRT PERRY, JR.
Negligence-Per Se or Evidence of-Violation of Statute as
In a recent case' plaintiff's decedent was killed by defendant's truck.
In an action brought to recover for the death, defendant claimed that
plaintiff's decedent was contributorily negligent in that at the time of
his death he was violating a statute requiring pedestrians to walk on
the left-hand side of any highway.2 Held: Plaintiff's decedent's violation of the statute did not make him contributorily negligent per se and
the question of his contributory negligence was for the jury.
Negligence is the failure to comply with the legal standard of care
"Winrod v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249, 251 (N. D. Ill.

1945).

" Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E. D. Pa. 1946) ("There is
discernible . . . a reluctance among the modem courts to apply that law (of
multiple tort liability) when confronted with a controvery involving large dis-

tributions of printed matter such as are made by present day newspaper and magazine publishers."); Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N. E.' 2d 708

(1948).
20 See Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 65, 78 N. E. 2d 708, 710 (1948)
("... no new cause of action will accrue if the subsequent distribution is reasonably connected, by trade practice relating to the type of printed matter involved,
to the original distribution. .. ").
'Lewis v. Watson, 229 N. C. 20, 47 S. E. 2d 484 (1948).
2N.
C. GENt. STAT. §20-174 (1943): "It shall be unlawful for pedestrians to
walk along the traveled portion of any highway except on the extreme left-hand

side thereof, and such pedestrians shall yield the right-of-way to approaching

traffic."
R .ESTATEMENT, TORTS §284 (1934) ; HARPER ON TORTS §§68, 69 (1933) ; CLERK
& LINDSELL ON TORTS §§12, 13 (7th ed., Wyatt-Paine, 1921) ; Moore v. Chicago

